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CLOSING THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY GAP 
RICHARD BRIFFAULT 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2013, shortly after winning election as New York City’s 
mayor—and some weeks before he was sworn into office—Bill de Blasio 
announced the formation of a “star-studded” public relations campaign that 
would help him secure the New York state legislature’s support for the funding 
of a centerpiece of his successful election campaign—universal 
pre-kindergarten for New York City’s children.1  The campaign would be run 
by a newly formed § 501(c)(4) tax-exempt corporation2—the Campaign for One 
New York (CONY)—which would raise donations from individuals, 
corporations, unions, and advocacy organizations to build public support and 
lobby Albany for “universal pre-K.”3  Over the next two-and-one-half years, 
CONY raised and spent over four million dollars, initially in support of 
universal pre-K, and then, after that goal was achieved, to promote another 
plank in the Mayor’s 2013 campaign platform—changes to the city’s land use 
 
 Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of Law. The 
author was chair of the New York City Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) during some of the period 
addressed in this Article. The facts discussed in this Article are drawn entirely from public reports 
and do not reflect any information the author gained from his COIB service. The opinions expressed 
are not intended to reflect any views of the COIB and are entirely his own. 
1. See Jill Colvin, Bill de Blasio Launches Star-Studded Campaign for Universal Pre-K, 
OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2013), https://observer.com/2013/12/bill-de-blasio-launches-campaign-for-
universal-pre-k/. 
2. Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(4) provides that the earnings of an entity organized 
not for profit but exclusively for promoting social welfare are not subject to income taxation. As 
“[s]eeking legislation germane to the organization’s programs is a permissible means of attaining 
social welfare purposes . . . ,” a § 501(c)(4) social welfare organization may engage in lobbying. 
IRS, SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS (2020), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-
non-profits/social-welfare-organizations. As “[t]he promotion of social welfare does not include 
direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition 
to any candidate for public office,” a § 501(c)(4) social welfare may not engage in electioneering. 
Id. However, it “may engage in some political activities, so long as that is not its primary activity.” 
Id. Despite the limits on the legal ability of § 501(c)(4) organizations to engage in campaign 
activities, they have become important “dark money” actors in elections. See, e.g., Sheldon 
Whitehouse, Dark Money and U.S. Courts: The Problem and Solutions, 57 HARV. J. LEGIS. 273, 
277 (2020). 
3. Id. 
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and zoning rules to increase affordable housing.4  The Mayor played an active 
role in fundraising for CONY, which received huge donations from real estate 
interests, unions, and other groups that did business with the City, and he 
participated in its activities, including attending fundraising events hosted by 
CONY.5  Much of CONY’s spending went to public relations and consulting 
firms that had ties to de Blasio’s 2013 mayoral campaign and much of its public 
campaign activity—videos aired on television or posted to social media 
platforms, robocalls, and mailers—featured either the name or appearance of 
the Mayor or his wife.6 
Unsurprisingly, CONY and the Mayor’s fundraising for it soon became 
the focus of considerable adverse attention, with the media, public interest 
groups, and watchdog organizations expressing concern that donors were being 
rewarded with favorable action by the City on matters affecting them.7  These 
allegations triggered investigations by law enforcement agencies, but ultimately 
no charges against the Mayor were brought. 
The New York City Campaign Finance Board (CFB) determined that 
CONY’s creation and distribution of communications promoting the Mayor, 
and the “extensive and repeated overlap” of CONY’s staff with the staffs of de 
Blasio’s 2013 and planned 2017 election campaigns, his mayoral staff “and Mr. 
de Blasio himself” established “coordination” between CONY and the Mayor’s 
election activities within the meaning of the City’s campaign finance law.8  So, 
too, the contributions to CONY were wildly above the amounts allowed by the 
campaign finance law and were from sources forbidden to contribute to 
municipal election campaigns.9  But the City’s campaign finance law had not 
been broken.  CONY’s communications in 2014 were after the 2013 election 
but also “occurred more than three years before [de Blasio’s] next covered 
election” in 2017.10  As a result, they could not be considered part of an election 
regulated by the campaign finance law or the kind of campaign activity that the 
 
4. See J. David Goodman, Nonprofit Linked to Mayor de Blasio is Closing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/nyregion/nonprofit-group-campaign-for-
one-new-york-with-close-ties-to-mayor-de-blasio-is-closing.html. 
5. See N.Y.C. Council Int. No. 1345-A, 5–6 (N.Y. 2016). Accord Laura Nahmias, De Blasio 




7. See, e.g., Michael Grynbaum, De Blasio Said to Seek Donations for Nonprofit to Promote 
His Policy Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/nyregion/m
ayor-de-blasio-is-quietly-soliciting-donations-for-future-policy-battles.html?searchResultPosition
=27. 
8. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd. Final Determination No. 2016-1 (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.nyccfb.info/law/advisory-opinions/2016-1-campaign-one-new-york-and-united-affor
dable-nyc/ [hereinafter CFB 2016]. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
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Board had authority to regulate.11  By the time the Board issued its 
determination in July 2016, CONY had stopped soliciting contributions and had 
begun to wind down its operations.12 
Similarly, the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York—whose investigation also encompassed donations-for-favors allegations 
concerning contributions to de Blasio’s 2013 mayoral election campaign as well 
as to CONY13—declined to bring any federal criminal indictments.  His public 
statement concerning the matter referred to “several circumstances in which 
Mayor de Blasio and others acting on his behalf solicited donations from 
individuals who sought official favors from the City, after which the Mayor 
made or directed inquiries to relevant City agencies on behalf of those 
donors.”14  Nonetheless, the U.S. Attorney determined not to charge the Mayor 
or his agents citing “the high burden of proof, the clarity of existing law, any 
recent changes in the law, and the particular difficulty of proving criminal intent 
in corruption schemes where there is no evidence of personal profit.”15 
As the CFB and U.S. Attorney statements underscore, CONY’s activities 
and de Blasio’s fundraising for them fell between two regulatory regimes—
election law and ethics.  Election law regulates the raising and spending of 
money for elections.  But de Blasio’s fundraising and CONY’s spending took 
place shortly after one election and long before the next one.  Although the 
favorable references to de Blasio in CONY’s advertising and public 
communications could have had “promotional benefits” for him, the CFB 
reasonably concluded that those benefits “likely dissipated” during the more 
than three years until the next election.16  Moreover, CONY’s spending 
“focused on issues being discussed by a governmental body.”17  They were not 




13. See William K. Rashbaum, Federal Inquiry into Mayor de Blasio Is Said to Focus on 
Whether Donors Got Favors, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/ny
region/bill-de-blasio-donors.html. 
14. Press Release, Acting U.S. Attorney Joon H. Kim Statement on the Investigation into 
City Hall Fundraising (Mar. 16, 2017) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Just.). 
15. Id. (emphasis added). 
16. CFB 2016, supra note 8. 
17. Id. 
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advocacy for an issue central to the Mayor’s policy agenda.18  CONY may have 
been lobbying,19 but it was not electioneering. 
By the same token, ethics regulation aims, inter alia, at preventing public 
servants from misusing their offices for personal gain, which typically means 
financial gain for the public servant, a family member, or a business associate.  
In the words of New York City’s conflicts of interest law, “[n]o public servant 
shall use or attempt to use his or her position as a public servant to obtain any 
financial gain, contract, license, privilege or other private or personal advantage, 
direct or indirect, for the public servant or any person or firm associated with 
the public servant.”20  But, as the U.S. Attorney’s statement indicated, the 
contributions de Blasio solicited were not intended to line his pocket or pad his 
bank account, but were to be used to advance his public policy goals.21 
To be sure, CONY’s spending could have had both electoral and personal 
benefits for the Mayor.  Achieving universal pre-K and changing zoning rules 
to promote affordable housing would demonstrate both his effectiveness in 
accomplishing his campaign promises and, if successful and popular as policies, 
would support his case for re-election.  That could also be considered a 
“personal advantage” for any politician who wants to hold elective office.  But 
election law rules are focused on the regulation of elections tout court, not the 
policy-making process generally, and ethics rules are targeted on the use of 
office for “personal profit,” not policy success.  The political advantages and 
personal gratification resulting from achieving the policies a politician has 
campaigned for are, in themselves, neither ethical nor electoral misconduct.  
Indeed, in a democratic society, one might hope that a politician would reap 
 
18. In campaign finance law, “issue advocacy” refers to a communication that explicitly 
refers to a candidate—often quite harshly—but is not considered to be a campaign message and 
therefore not subject to campaign finance law restrictions because it avoids expressly advocating 
the election or defeat of that candidate. See generally Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing 
the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999). The distinction between express advocacy 
and issue advocacy was created by the Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, to protect general 
political speech from campaign regulation. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 16–19, 23, 29 
(1976). As many scholars have pointed out, it is easy to create effective campaign ads that fall within 
the issue advocacy exemption. See, e.g., Briffault, supra. Ads that purport to be about political 
issues but are really campaign advertisements have come to be known as “sham issue ads.” See, 
e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 185 (2003). 
19. See New York State Joint Comm’n. on Pub. Ethics v. Campaign for One N.Y., Inc., 37 
N.Y.S.3d 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (noting that CONY had registered as a lobbyist for 2014 but 
was resisting registering as a lobbyist for 2015). 
20. N.Y.C. Charter § 2604(b)(3). 
21. Of course, the contributions provided significant financial rewards for consultants and 
lobbyists politically allied with Mayor de Blasio. See, e.g., Samar Khurshid, The Hole in the 
Mayor’s Money-into-Pockets Defense, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/6797-the-big-hole-in-the-mayor-s-money-into-pockets-defen
se; Thomas Kaplan, Mayor de Blasio’s Hired Guns: Private Consultants Help Shape City Hall, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/nyregion/mayor-de-blasios-
hired-guns-private-consultants-help-shape-city-hall.html. 
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both electoral rewards and personal pleasure from successfully pushing for good 
public policies. 
Yet, as the complaints about the Mayor’s fundraising indicate, there is 
something problematic about elected officials being able to raise unlimited sums 
from individuals or organizations with business pending or potentially pending 
before them or their subordinates for programs—even socially worthy 
programs—that are among their top political priorities.  The very same concerns 
that drive the regulation of both campaign contributions to candidates and gifts 
to public servants—that the official’s decision-making will be more receptive 
to the interests of their donors, and the public perception that such skewed 
decision-making occurs—are present when elected officials or their agents 
solicit funds for organizations intended to promote their policy goals, 
particularly when they are publicly identified with its operations. 
CONY and Mayor de Blasio were operating in what I call a “public 
integrity gap” when they sought funds for a purpose neither electoral nor 
personally financially beneficial to the Mayor from individuals or organizations 
whose interests the Mayor was in a position to favor with the powers of his 
office.  Nor was the CONY episode unique.  The last decade has witnessed the 
growing use by elected officials, particularly state and local chief executives, of 
affiliated nonprofit organizations to advance their policy goals.22  Some of these, 
like CONY, are engaged in public advocacy for the executive’s legislative or 
regulatory program.  Some, like the Mayor’s Fund for Los Angeles,23 operate 
more like conventional charities, seeking philanthropic support for a range of 
social welfare programs like youth employment, assistance for the homeless, or 
disaster relief.  Yet to the extent they involve fundraising by chief executives or 
their agents,24 staffing by close associates of the chief executive, or public 
communications that prominently feature the name or likeness of the chief 
executive, they also raise the concerns of official favoritism or the appearance 
of such favoritism to donors that lie at the heart of public integrity law. 
This Article addresses this public integrity gap and possible means for 
closing it.  Part II examines the emergence of elected-official-affiliated 
nonprofits, particularly at the state and local level.  Part III considers the public 
integrity gap revealed by these nonprofits and regulatory approaches that would 
 
22. See, e.g., Karyn Bruggeman and National Journal, The Permanent Campaign: How 
Outside Money is Changing the Way Governors Do Business, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-permanent-campaign-how-outside-mone
y-is-changing-the-way-governors-do-business/434802/. 
23. See MAYOR’S FUND FOR LOS ANGELES, https://mayorsfundla.org/home/ (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2021). 
24. See, e.g., Eric Garcetti’s Mayor’s Fund Lets Companies Give Big, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 3, 
2015); Anna Sanders, Nonprofit to Raise from Donors with Business Before City – Skirting 
Campaign Finance Rules in Quest for City Hall, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-eric-adams-nonprofit-donors-business-before-city
-campaign-finances-20190811-ifhehrejurbi7l3pswqza6hjua-story.html. 
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close the gap.25  Like our laws dealing with both elections and ethics, new 
regulations need to focus on promoting transparency and restricting pay-to-play 
donations.26  In the aftermath of the CONY episode, New York City adopted 
such a law, which provides a template for other jurisdictions to consider.  Part 
IV explores the constitutional questions that likely would be raised by 
regulating officeholder-affiliated nonprofits.  Part V concludes. 
II. THE RISE OF ELECTED-OFFICIAL-AFFILIATED NONPROFITS 
A. Advocacy Organizations 
The precise origins of the phenomenon of elected-official-affiliated 
nonprofits are uncertain.  A study by the Brennan Center for Justice points to 
the establishment of Organizing for Action (OFA) at the start of President 
Obama’s second term in 2013.  OFA was started by veterans of the Obama 
White House and of his 2012 reelection campaign to promote and defend 
Obamacare and “other signature policies of the then-president.”27  This OFA 
was actually a descendant of an earlier OFA—Organizing for America—which 
was formed on the eve of Obama’s first term in 2009.  That OFA, in turn, 
consciously echoed an even earlier OFA—Obama for America—which was 
Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign committee.  The 2009 OFA also sought 
 
25. In an important recent article, Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos examines an 
overlapping phenomenon—what he calls “Quasi Campaign Finance.” Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, 
Quasi Campaign Finance, 70 DUKE L. J. 333 (2020). His focus is on public campaigns waged 
outside the electoral context by wealthy individuals, businesses, labor unions, and the nonprofits 
they support. In his view, because these campaigns “pay[] for political communications with voters” 
then even though “these communications are nonelectoral yet [they] rely on an electoral link to be 
effective,” and so can be considered to be quasi-electioneering. Id. at 336. Acknowledging Professor 
Stephanopoulos’s point that the ultimate goal of electioneering is policymaking, I am more inclined 
to treat electioneering and policymaking as distinct spheres, with different practices and subject to 
different rules, although they are closely related, and both fall within the broader domain of 
democratic self-governance. I am not sure how much turns on the difference between treating 
elected-official-affiliated nonprofits as a special case of quasi campaign finance, or as its own 
problem—although my approach may have the advantage of seeing the funding of 
elected-official-affiliated nonprofits  through the government ethics as well as the campaign finance 
lens.   
26. “Pay-to-play” restrictions limit the ability of an individual or entity to contribute to the 
campaign of an elected official who has the power to take a discretionary official action that can 
directly benefit the donor. See, e.g., N.Y. State Republican Comm. v. SEC, 927 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (sustaining SEC rule limiting political contributions of broker-dealers, who act as “placement 
agents” for investment advisers to help them secure contracts advising a government entity). 
27. CHISUN LEE, DOUGLAS KEITH & AVA MEHTA, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ELECTED 
OFFICIALS, SECRET CASH: HOW POLITICIANS USE NONPROFITS TO CLOAK SPENDING AFTER 
ELECTION DAY 2 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/EO%20S
ecret%20Cash.%20Foreword.%20March%2023.pdf. 
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to promote Obama’s legislative priorities, particularly health care reform,28 but 
that OFA was a project of and housed in the Democratic National Committee, 
and therefore subject to the federal campaign finance laws applicable to political 
parties, including contribution limits and disclosure requirements.29  The 2013 
OFA was independent of the party and officially non-partisan.  However, its 
formation was jointly announced by Obama’s 2012 campaign manager and First 
Lady Michelle Obama,30 and its executive director came directly from the 
Obama White House staff,31 so its connection to President Obama was apparent.  
By formally separating from the Democratic Party and organizing as a 
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare organization, the 2013 OFA could raise unlimited 
funds without having to report their sources, although it ultimately chose 
voluntarily to disclose its donors.32 
At the subnational level, there were elected-official-affiliated nonprofits 
even before the OFA morphed into its nonprofit form.  At his urging, business 
allies of newly-elected Governor Andrew Cuomo in late 2010 created a 
§ 501(c)(4) organization—the Committee to Save New York (CSNY)—to raise 
and spend money to promote Cuomo’s legislative agenda, which included 
balancing the state’s budget through spending cuts and public employee pension 
reforms, rather than new taxes or tax increases.33  The incoming governor feared 
the likely resistance of powerful public employee unions to his budget 
initiatives and urged business interests to use the CSNY to mount a public 
relations campaign as a counterweight to the unions.  Although Cuomo was not 
directly engaged in the operations of or fundraising for CSNY, “a public 
relations and consulting firm closely tied to the new governor”34 represented the 
organization.  Cuomo publicly endorsed the group, which, in turn, spent 
millions on radio and TV advertisements promoting his agenda.  The 
advertisements often featured and praised him by name; one was so positive that 
 
28. Paul Steinhauser, ‘Obama for America’ to Morph into ‘Organizing for Action’, CNN: 




31. Rick Cohen, Who Does Organizing for Action Work for?, NONPROFIT Q. (Jan. 18, 2013), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/who-does-organizing-for-action-work-for/. 
32. See Organizing for Action: Who’s Giving to Obama-Linked Nonprofit?, OPEN SECRETS 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/06/organizing-for-action-whos-giving-to-obama-linked-n
onprofit/ (June 17, 2014). According to a study conducted by the Center for Responsive Politics and 
the Sunlight Foundation, “[m]any of OFA’s donors . . . turn out to be major political givers with 
long histories of backing Democratic candidates.” Id. 
33. Charles V. Bagli, Business Group Prepares Plan to Counter Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
7, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/nyregion/08save.html?searchResultPosition=4. 
34. Nicholas Confessore & Thomas Kaplan, Group Takes on Albany with Cuomo’s 
Blessing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/nyregion/18cuomo.ht
ml?searchResultPosition=21. 
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it later wound up on the governor’s website promoting his budget proposal.35  
CSNY did not directly coordinate its actions with Cuomo, but, as a committee 
spokesman (who had previously worked for Cuomo’s father, Governor Mario 
Cuomo) explained, it did not have to: “[w]e know what the governor’s agenda 
is, and we don’t need a lot of guidance.”36  CSNY was the top spending lobbying 
organization in New York State in 2011 and 2012 before disbanding.  Media 
accounts linked CSNY’s dissolution to a new state law requiring lobbying 
organizations like CSNY to disclose their donors, as well as to the negative 
public attention to a large donation to CSNY from a gambling company, which 
seemed to coincide with the Governor’s endorsement of an expansion of casino 
gambling in the state.37 
The use of state or local elected-official-affiliated nonprofits was not 
limited to Democrats, or to New Yorkers.  In New Jersey, Republican Governor 
Chris Christie benefited from the public advocacy of two different § 501(c)(4) 
committees.  Reform Jersey Now, set up shortly after Christie took office in 
2010, quickly raised over $600,000, which it spent on radio advertisements, 
robocalls, and mailers to promote his agenda of civil service reform, public 
employee pension and benefit changes, and a property tax cap.38  Christie denied 
any “responsibility” for the group,39 but he welcomed its support,40 and was a 
featured speaker at one of the group’s significant public events.41  Officially 
nonpartisan, the group’s “volunteer advisory board reads like a who’s who list 
of the state’s Republican establishment” and Christie’s chief strategist during 
his gubernatorial campaign was the group’s spokesman.42  Donors included 
 
35. Thomas Kaplan, Coalition Spends Millions Promoting Cuomo’s Agenda, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/nyregion/cuomo-gets-help-promoting-
agenda-from-business-leaders.html?searchResultPosition=20. 
36. Confessore & Kaplan, supra note 34. 
37. See, e.g., Casey Seiler, Saying They Accomplished Their Goals, CSNY Disbands, TIMES 
UNION (Aug. 30, 2013),  https://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/194179/saying-they-
accomplished-their-goals-csny-disbands/; Michael Gormley, Cuomo Lobbying Group Loses 
Contributions as State Ethics Law Requires Donor Disclosure, SARATOGIAN (May 12, 2013), 
https://www.saratogian.com/news/cuomo-lobbying-group-loses-contributions-as-state-ethics-law-
requires-donor-disclosure/article_46af8bb9-af11-52c0-8679-fb31eeef5d06.html; Editorial, The 
Governor and the Committee, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/o
pinion/gov-cuomo-and-the-committee.html?searchResultPosition=1. 
38. See, e.g., Lisa Fleisher, Pro-Christie Group Reveals Political Spending, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 29, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-METROB-11304; Matt Friedman, Reform 
Jersey Now Has Raised $624K to Push Gov. Christie’s Agenda (Dec. 29, 2010), 
https://www.nj.com/news/2010/12/reform_jersey_now_raises_624k.html. 
39. See Gov. Christie States He’s Not Responsible for Reform Jersey Now Group that Skirts 
Pay-to-Play Rules, NJ.COM (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2010/07/gov_chris_christie
_defends_tie.html. 
40. Id. 
41. See Darryl Isherwood, Christie Attends Reform Jersey Now Breakfast, OBSERVER (June 
23, 2010), https://observer.com/2010/06/christie-attends-reform-jersey-now-breakfast/. 
42. Friedman, supra note 38. 
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major state contractors.43  Christie subsequently benefited from the work of a 
second § 501(c)(4), the Committee for Our Children’s Future, “a group set up 
by his college friends,” that spent more than $6 million on television 
advertisements and other efforts to promote his agenda and salute his efforts.44  
Although Christie emphasized his independence from this group as well,45 its 
communications praised him and his programs.  One television advertisement 
“portrayed [Christie] as the adult” in state government, cleaning up the mess 
left by the childish legislature.46   
Christie’s Democratic successor as governor of New Jersey, Phil Murphy, 
has also enjoyed the backing of a well-financed supportive § 501(c)(4).  Shortly 
after Murphy’s election in 2017, three former campaign aides formed New 
Directions New Jersey to promote his agenda.  The group, run by his former 
campaign manager, former campaign consultants, and former campaign pollster 
raised $6.8 million within its first two years.  Like Cuomo’s CSNY, it spent 
heavily during the state’s budget season on television advertisements—in which 
Murphy starred—urging the legislature to enact Murphy’s budget program; 
although unlike Cuomo and CSNY, Murphy and New Directions New Jersey 
were seeking a tax increase, not spending cuts.  After considerable public 
controversy and embarrassment for the Governor, the committee, which was 
under no legal obligation to disclose its donors, finally did so, revealing that 
most of its money came from the State’s public sector unions.47 
And, of course, New York and New Jersey are not alone in the 
proliferation of elected-affiliated nonprofits.  Soon after Illinois voters elected 
Republican Bruce Rauner governor, two former campaign aides formed 
“Turnaround Illinois,” a § 501(c)(4) to promote his legislative agenda.48  In 
 
43. Id. 
44. See Salvador Rizzo, Committee Run by Christie’s Friends Praises His Budget in $1.2M 
Ad, NJ.COM (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2012/07/committee_run_by_christies_fri.
html. 
45. See, e.g., Max Pizarro, Committee for Our Children’s Future Undertakes $1.5 Million 
Ad Campaign, OBSERVER (Sept. 20, 2011), https://observer.com/2011/09/committee-for-our-
childrens-future-undertakes-1-5-million-ad-campaign/. 
46. Erin O’Neill, PolitiFact N.J.: Committee for Our Children’s Future Runs Second Ad 
Promoting Chris Christie, NJ.COM (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2012/01/politifact_
nj_committe_for_our.html. 
47. See, e.g., Andrew Seidman, Dark Money Group Aligned with Gov. Phil Murphy Finally 
Discloses Donors, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/phil-
murphy-dark-money-new-direction-nj-disclose-donors-20190912.html; Charles Stile, ‘Dark 
Money’ Politics Shadows Gov. Phil Murphy Despite His Call to Make Donor Names Public , 
NORTHJERSEY.COM. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/columnists/charles-
stile/2019/01/07/murphy-faces-nj-dark-money-problem-over-secret-donors/2482953002/; Matt 
Friedman, Murphy: Group Run by My Campaign Advisers Should Disclose Its Donors, POLITICO 
(Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2019/01/04/murphy-group-run-
by-my-campaign-advisers-should-disclose-its-donors-773033. 
48. See Monique Garcia, Aides Form Super PAC to Promote Illinois Governor’s Agenda, 
GOVERNING (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.governing.com/archive/aides-form-super-pac-to-
promote-illinois-governors-agenda.html. 
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Maryland, Governor Larry Hogan has been actively raising money for Change 
Maryland, a non-profit intended “to build support for Hogan’s second-term 
goals” including anti-tax messaging, his education plan, and redistricting 
reform.49  Hogan’s fundraising letter for the organization indicated that donors 
could expect their money to be “spent to direct the public to call, email, crowd 
hearing rooms, and put pressure on their legislators.”50  Unlike the other 
§ 501(c)(4)’s discussed so far, Hogan’s initiative was launched long after he had 
already won re-election to his second and—due to term limits—final term.  For 
that very reason, as a state election official acknowledged, campaign finance 
rules did not apply to the group, despite Hogan’s undisputed connection to it, 
because Hogan was not running for office.51 
It would be tedious to go through every elected-official-affiliated 
nonprofit, even when limited just to those connected to governors.  A study by 
the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) found that 
nineteen governors in office at the start of 2017 could be linked to thirty such 
supportive committees.52 Excluding those that appear to have electoral as well 
as policy goals or a connection to an election campaign, the group found 
seventeen governors had ties to twenty-four groups created to support their 
policy agendas.53  As the study found, some governors were actively and 
publicly involved with these supportive groups.  A number of governors either 
raised  funds for the supportive groups,54 or were featured in advertisements 
paid for by the groups.55  The organizations were typically run by friends, family 
members, former campaign staff, or other close associates of the governor.56 
 
49. See Erin Cox, Hogan Raising ‘Dark’ Money to Boost His 
Agenda, Stop Costly Education Plan, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/md-politics/hogan-raising-dark-money-to-boost-his-agenda-stop-costly-education-
plan/2019/09/19/d0bba432-d324-11e9-9343-40db57cf6abd_story.html. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. See MAYA GOLD, CITIZENS FOR RESP. AND ETHICS IN WASH., SHADOW 
GOVERNORS: HOW NONPROFITS WITH ANONYMOUS DONORS INFLUENCE POLITICS AND POLICY IN 
THE STATES 3 (2018). 
53. See id. at 8, tbl.1. 
54. See, e.g., id. at 20 (fundraising by Idaho Governor Otter and his wife for Education 
Voters of Idaho, Inc.), 28 (Louisiana Governor Edwards spoke at fundraiser for Rebuild Louisiana), 
43 (Montana Governor Bullock fundraised for Early Edge Action and spoke at a rally). 
55. See, e.g., id. at 22–23 (Illinois Governor Rauner appeared in an ad run by 
Turnaround Illinois); 28 (Louisiana Governor Edwards appeared in an ad released by Rebuild 
Louisiana in support of his budget plan). 
56. See, e.g., id. at 12 (Alabama Council for Excellent Government founded by 
Governor Bentley’s former legal adviser), 17 (Georgia Leads, Inc. run by someone previously in 
Governor Deal’s office), 26 (in Kansas, president of Road Map Solutions was Governor 
Brownback’s former chief of staff, and group’s director was the Governor’s campaign treasurer), 
30 (Governor LePage’s daughter was executive director of Maine People Before Politics from 
2015–2017), 39 (A New Missouri was founded by Governor Greitens’ campaign finance director 
and campaign treasurer; executive director was the Governor’s sister-in-law); 62 (principal staff of 
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In other words, just as in electoral politics a candidate’s formal campaign 
committee is frequently accompanied and bolstered by the work of independent 
Super PACs and dark money groups not subject to the rules applicable to the 
candidate’s personal campaign committee, many governors now pursue their 
policy agendas with the support of “shadow” advocacy nonprofits.57  Two of 
these groups—in Alabama and Missouri—were caught up in the misconduct of 
their governors, who ultimately resigned.58  But the real issue for most of these 
groups is not what is illegal but what is legal: the lack of mandatory disclosure 
of their donors and the lack of any restriction on the solicitation or receipt of 
contributions from individuals or organizations who have interests before the 
state that the governor has the authority to affect.  Some of these groups have 
voluntarily disclosed some of their donors, but the timing and contents of 
disclosure have been highly variable.59  It does not appear that any have taken 
any significant voluntary steps to limit the potential for pay-to-play donations. 
B. Service-Delivery Charitable Organizations 
The nonprofit elected-affiliated groups discussed so far are, for federal tax 
purposes, § 501(c)(4) “social welfare” organizations, which can engage in 
public advocacy, such as lobbying for or against legislative or regulatory 
proposals, as well as a limited amount of electoral activity.  These are the 
organizations that elected officials have turned to when they want their allies to 
raise funds to mount advocacy campaigns to support their legislative agendas.  
Due to their ability to undertake public political advocacy with unlimited and 
undisclosed donations, they resemble the dark money groups that have come to 
play a growing role in elections.  There is another category of elected-affiliated 
groups less focused on policy and politics that has drawn less attention and less 
controversy, but that still provide donors an opportunity for undue influence. 
Many officials, particularly at the local level, have created § 501(c)(3) 
charitable nonprofits to raise contributions to supplement the kinds of programs 
that their governments provide.  At a time when many local governments are 
facing financial difficulties, such organizations provide a way to tap into private 
philanthropy to support public services.  This is the model provided by the many 
“mayor’s funds”—such as the Mayor’s Fund to Advance New York City,60 the 
Mayor’s Fund for Los Angeles,61 the Mayor’s Fund for Philadelphia,62 the Long 
 
Tennessee Business Partnership came from public relations firm closely connected to Governor 
Haslam). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 3, 5, 12–14, 41–42. 
59. Id. at 6–7. 
60. See About the Fund, MAYOR’S FUND TO ADVANCE NEW YORK CITY, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/fund/about/about.page (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
61. See MAYOR’S FUND FOR LOS ANGELES, https://mayorsfundla.org/home/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
62. See Who We Are, THE MAYOR’S FUND FOR PHILADELPHIA, 
http://www.mayorsfundphila.org/about/who-we-are/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3843923
ELECTED AFFILIATED NONPROFITS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2021  11:29 AM 
112 NOTRE  DAME  JOURNAL  OF  LAW,  ETHICS  &  PUBLIC  POLICY [Vol. 35:2 
Beach, California’s Mayor’s Fund for Education,63 the Mayor’s Fund for Las 
Vegas Life,64 and similar organizations around the country.65  These Funds 
typically operate as public-private hybrids, with connections to both city 
government and the private sector.  The degree of direct mayoral involvement 
in fundraising for and the operations of these funds may vary.  Some are housed 
in the mayor’s office and receive staff or office spaces from city government, 
while others are under the direction of relatively independent boards with just a 
limited number of mayoral appointees.  In New York City, the Mayor’s Fund 
has a place on the City’s website; the chair of the board of directors is the 
mayor’s spouse,66 and the mayor has been publicly associated with its activity.67  
In Los Angeles, Mayor Eric Garcetti “frequently namechecks the Mayor’s Fund 
for Los Angeles, which has assumed a major role in the city’s response to the 
coronavirus pandemic.”68 
These funds no doubt often do valuable work.  By August 2020, the Los 
Angeles Fund had provided $56 million in aid for COVID relief projects, 
including home meal delivery for seniors, childcare for hospital workers, and 
shelter and services for domestic violence survivors.69  The New York City 
 
63. See About MAYOR’S FUND FOR EDUCATION, http://mayorsfundfored.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
64. See About the Fund, MAYOR’S FUND FOR LAS VEGAS LIFE, 
https://mayorsfundlv.org/About-the-Fund (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
65. Many such “funds” operate on a sub-municipal basis, created by and supporting a 
specific local agency. In New York City, for example, there is a Fund for Public Housing, created 
in 2016 to provide financial support for the New York City Housing Authority. See About Us, FUND 
FOR PUBLIC HOUSING, https://www.fundforpublichousing.org/(last visited Mar. 7, 2021); a Fund 
for Public Schools, to support the City’s Department of Education. See Our Mission, FUND FOR 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, https://www.fundforpublicschools.org/mission (last visited Mar. 7, 2021); and, 
at the borough-level, the One Brooklyn Fund created by the borough president of Brooklyn to 
“promote[] collaboration and engagement among Brooklyn’s diverse communities through events, 
programs, and services.” See ONE BROOKLYN FUND INC., https://onebrooklynfund.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2021). Local elected officials may be closely affiliated with these entities as well. See, e.g., 
Sanders, supra note 24 (skirting campaign finance rules in quest for City Hall). 
66. See Board Leadership, MAYOR’S FUND TO ADVANCE NEW YORK CITY, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/fund/about/board-leadership.page (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
67. See Laura Nahmias, Mayor’s Fund Raised $25M in Fiscal 2016, POLITICO, 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2016/07/mayors-fund-raised-25-million-
in-2016-fiscal-year-104078 (July 21, 2016, 5:32 AM). 
68. Aaron Mendelson, $42 Million and Counting: Mayor’s Nonprofit Plays Major 
Role in Pandemic Response, LAIST, https://laist.com/2020/05/11/mayors-fund-eric-garcetti-
donors-database.php (May 11, 2020, 6:00 AM). Accord City News Service, Two LA COVID-19 
Initiatives Reach Funding Goals, Mayor Says, NBC LOS ANGELES, https://www.nbclosangeles.co
m/news/local/two-la-covid-19-initiatives-reach-funding-goals-mayor-says/2492518/ (Dec. 23, 
2020). 
69. See City News Service, LA Mayor’s Fund Raises $56 Million to Help Those Hit 
by Coronavirus Outbreak, LOS ANGELES DAILY NEWS, https://www.dailynews.com/2020/08/12/la-
mayors-fund-raises-56-million-to-help-those-hit-by-coronavirus-outbreak (Aug. 12, 2020, 12:18 
PM). 
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Fund has supported mental health services and youth employment;70 the Las 
Vegas Fund has taken on a range of initiatives including homelessness, youth 
sports, and public art.71  As § 501(c)(3) organizations they can engage in only a 
limited amount of public advocacy and no electioneering, so they likely provide 
less of a boost to the mayor’s public image or political success.  Yet, to the 
extent that the mayor is closely associated with the fund, and especially if the 
mayor solicits contributions for it,72 donations to these funds—which typically 
are not subject to any dollar limits or to public donor disclosure requirements—
can be another way individuals or organizations that do business with a city can 
establish a positive relationship with a mayor.  As one donor to the Los Angeles 
mayor’s fund explained, not only did he support the fund’s programmatic goals, 
but “he also saw the gift as a way to forge bonds with Garcetti.”73  Even if the 
fund doesn’t undertake quasi-electoral campaigns in support of a mayor’s policy 
initiatives, any favorable publicity that accompanies a fund’s work can benefit 
the mayor’s popularity and political fortune as well.  As a result, even 
§ 501(c)(3) funds, notwithstanding the good work they often do, can be a source 
of potential pay-to-play concern.74 
III. CLOSING THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY GAP 
A. Gifts, Campaign Contributions, and Elected-Affiliated Organizations 
A central concern of government ethics is the provision of a private benefit 
to a public servant in exchange for an official action that benefits the donor.  An 
exchange that involves an intentional quid pro quo can be prosecuted as a bribe.  
Many ethics laws go beyond bribery to proscribe or limit gifts in which there is 
no actual quid pro quo due to the real possibility that gifts may subtly influence 
the public servant’s official decision-making, or appear to do so.  Gifts provided 
even without strings attached may cause a grateful public servant to be more 
favorably disposed to his or her benefactor’s interest in a government action the 
public servant can affect.  So, too, the acceptance of gifts or comparable benefits 
can create an appearance of favoritism that undermines public confidence in 
 
70. See About the Fund, MAYOR’S FUND TO ADVANCE NEW YORK CITY, supra 
note 60. 
71. See Priorities & Initiatives, MAYOR’S FUND FOR LAS VEGAS LIFE, 
https://mayorsfundlv.org/Programs-Initiatives (last visited Mar. 7, 2021). 
72. See Aaron Mendelson & Mary Plummer, ‘A Tricky Area of Philanthropy’: LA 
Mayor Solicits Millions for His Favored Causes, S. CA. PUB. RADIO, https://www.scpr.org/news/
2017/08/23/74917/la-mayor-garcetti-behested-payments/, (Aug. 23, 2017). 
73. See Peter Jamison et al., Eric Garcetti’s Mayor’s Fund Lets Companies Give Big, 
L.A. TIMES, https://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-0303-garcetti-fund-20150303-
story.html (Mar. 3, 2015). 
74. See Rich Calder, Feds Probe Eric Adams’ Non-Profit Over Donor Favor Claims, 
N.Y. POST, https://nypost.com/2016/08/08/feds-probe-eric-adams-non-profit-over-donor-favor-
claims/ (Aug. 8, 2016) (federal investigators probing fundraising activities of the One Brooklyn 
Fund, Inc., created by Brooklyn Borough President Eric Adams to advance his summer concert 
series and other projects). 
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government.  By prohibiting gifts in circumstances in which a reasonable person 
would infer that the gift could influence official decision-making, ethics rules 
can deter both actual corruption and undue influence short of criminal 
misconduct, and thereby promote the integrity of government and public 
confidence in government integrity. 
Campaign contributions are the exception that prove the rule.  They clearly 
provide a benefit to the candidate who receives them who, if he or she wins 
office, will be in a position to reward the donor.  That may very well be a reason 
for the donation.  But in a democracy in which campaigns cost money, there is 
minimal to no public funding of campaigns, and elective office needs to be open 
to candidates who do not have the means to fund their campaigns out of their 
own resources, campaign contributions are essential, and protected by the First 
Amendment.75  The tension between banning gifts and permitting campaign 
contributions is to some degree mitigated by campaign finance laws that require 
campaign contributions to be: (i) donated to a legally distinct campaign 
committee; (ii) publicly reported and disclosed; and (iii) limited in amount.  
Some jurisdictions go further and adopt so-called “pay-to-play” restrictions that 
more tightly limit or bar contributions from individuals or entities that do 
business or seek to do business with, or are subject to regulation by, the office 
that the candidate is seeking.  In addition, to prevent campaign contributions 
from subverting a gift ban, campaign finance laws typically bar the “personal 
use” of campaign funds.76 
As described in Part II, contributions to elected-official-affiliated 
nonprofits fall into a gap between ethics regulation and campaign finance law.  
Gift bans focus on the provision of “things of value,” which, even when broadly 
defined, are still limited to things that provide some kind of pecuniary benefit 
to the official, a family member, or someone comparably associated with the 
official.  Contributions to affiliated committees surely involve things of value 
but they are not given “to” the official, but to a legally separate entity for policy 
advocacy or charitable purpose.  If a particular donation winds up in the 
official’s bank account (or pays for a luxury vacation), that could be a violation 
of the jurisdiction’s ethics law.  But there is likely no problem under a traditional 
ethics law with donations given and used for advocacy or charitable purposes 
by organizations affiliated with the official. 
So, too, these donations do not support electioneering.  The policy 
advocacy nonprofits are often created and initially funded after an election, 
when the official is preparing to, or has just taken office, and sees the need for 
a well-funded public campaign to overcome the political obstacles to the 
enactment of his or her legislative agenda.  Others may be used by a 
 
75. A campaign contribution tied to an express quid pro quo for favorable government 
action can be prosecuted as a bribe. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273–74 (1991); 
cf. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (campaign contribution found to be illegal 
gratuity). 
76. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b). 
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term-limited incumbent unable to seek re-election.77  As for the charitable 
service-delivery nonprofits, federal tax law requires them to avoid political 
advocacy work. 
In some states, lobbying laws may require the public advocacy committees 
to report their expenditures.  But some jurisdictions define lobbying narrowly 
to exclude the kind of “grassroots lobbying”—radio, television, social media 
advertising, mailers, and robocalls—that target the general public rather than 
the legislature directly.78  In those jurisdictions, the advocacy committee would 
likely be exempt from reporting requirements.  Moreover, even in jurisdictions 
whose lobbying laws cover grassroots advocacy, disclosure requirements are 
often limited to just the reporting of expenditures.  A few jurisdictions go further 
and require the disclosure of the identities of the individuals or organizations 
funding the lobbying campaign and the sums that the donors provided, but many 
do not.79  In those situations, the public knows only that some group with an 
anodyne name like the “committee for good government” funded the advocacy 
activity, but they have no idea who is funding the “committee for good 
government.”  Moreover, even when lobbying laws provide some transparency 
concerning the size and sources of the donations funding the public advocacy 
lobbying, they do not impose limits, even on donations from individuals or 
organizations that do business with the government lobbied.80  As a result, 
lobbying laws at best fill the public integrity only partially.  Laws that require 
both donor transparency and limits on potential pay-to-play donations are 
necessary to close the integrity gap. 
B. Establishing Transparency and Contribution Limits for 
Elected-Official-Affiliated Organizations 
New York City, which acted in the aftermath of the CONY episode, 
provides one model of how to do this.  The New York measure, adopted by the 
City Council in late 2016 and modified in 2019, has three elements. 
First, any “organization[] affiliated with an elected official” must annually 
submit a publicly available report about itself, indicating the names of its 
principal officers and board members, the elected official with which it is 
affiliated, and the names of any individuals or entities that donated $5,000 or 
more to the organization in the previous calendar year.81  There is a potentially 
very open-ended exception from donor disclosure for “a donor who does not 
wish to have their identity made public.”82  For such $5,000+ donors, only the 
dates and amounts of their donations need be disclosed.  In addition, if the 
reporting entity provides persuasive evidence that disclosure would “cause 
 
77. Cox, supra note 49. 
78. See, e g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of 
Lobbying, 13 ELEC. L.J. 160, 186–90 (2014). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 165. 
81. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-902(b) (2021). 
82. Id. at § 3-902(b)(7). 
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harm, threats, harassment, or reprisal[] to the donor, or to individuals or property 
affiliated with the donor,” the name of such a donor shall not be publicly 
disclosed.83  It is not clear if the anti-harassment exception is intended to limit 
the bases for a donor or entity to seek exemption from disclosure or whether the 
law provides two separate bases for exceptions from disclosure.84  If the latter, 
then the donor disclosure “requirement” begins to look voluntary. 
The real bite of the law is its second part, which addresses so called 
“restricted” organizations, defined as “organizations affiliated with an elected 
official” that “spend or reasonably expect to spend at least 10% of the 
expenditures in the current or next calendar year on the production or 
dissemination of elected official communications.”85  “Elected official 
communications,” in turn, consist of communications via broadcast, print, 
telephone, or paid internet advertising that include the name, voice, or likeness 
of the elected official with which the organization is affiliated.86  These 
“restricted organizations” may not accept donations in excess of $400 a year 
from any person who does business with the City, and may accept donations 
only from natural persons.87  These restrictions track the “doing business” 
restrictions on donations to candidates for City office under the City’s campaign 
finance law.  The City maintains a database of organizations “doing business” 
with the City, which determines which donors are subject to the restriction. 
Third, the law defines what it means for an organization to be “affiliated” 
with the elected official.  For some organizations that will be relatively 
straightforward.  If an organization is incorporated as the “mayor’s fund” it is 
not a great stretch to determine that it is affiliated with the mayor.  But for many 
organizations—like CONY—the relationship is less formal.  The New York 
City law focuses on whether a city elected official or an agent or appointee of 
the elected official “exercises control” over the organization.  It then sets out a 
multi-factor test for the City’s Conflicts of Interest Board (COIB) to apply to 
determine whether the official exercises control.  These include: whether the 
organization was created by the elected official or an agent of the official, or by 
an individual who was previously employed by, or was a paid political 
consultant of, the elected official; whether the organization is chaired by the 
elected official or an agent of the official; “the degree of involvement or 
direction by the elected official in such organization’s policies, operations, and 
activities,” and “such other factors” as the COIB shall determine by rule.88 
 
83. Id. at § 3-902(c) 
84. The relevant City Council committee report is silent on this point. GENERAL 
COUNSEL & COMM. ON STANDARDS & ETHICS, COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT INT. NO. 
1272 (N.Y.C. 2018). 
85. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-902(a). 
86. Id. at § 3-901. The definition exempts communications with journalists or news 
media staff; communications to the members of the organizations; or communications in connection 
with a debate, town hall or forum in which more than one candidate or proponents of two or more 
sides of an issue are invited to participate. 
87. Id. at § 3-903.  
88. Id. at § 3-901. 
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This is, of course, extremely open-ended, and mixes relatively objective 
factors like whether the organization was created by former staff of or political 
consultants to the elected official, with the more indeterminate “degree of 
involvement” of the elected official in the organization’s policies, operations, 
and activities.  To be sure, the elected official’s “degree of involvement” is a 
crucial factor.  But it is hard to assess—both quantitatively (how much is the 
official involved?) and qualitatively (how much involvement is needed to 
establish affiliation?)—in tandem with the other factors. 
The definition of “affiliation” would benefit from more concreteness.  The 
personnel used to establish an affiliation between the elected official and the 
organization could be expanded to include members of the elected official’s 
family.  The definition of former employees could be clarified to confirm they 
include employees from both the elected official’s government position and his 
or her former election campaign.89  Looking to the federal regulations that 
define whether a political committee is coordinating its efforts with a campaign 
committee, the law could also treat as evidence of affiliation the sharing of 
consultants or commercial vendors between the advocacy committee and any 
campaign committee of the elected official.90 
“Degree of involvement” could also be concretized by treating solicitation 
of funds for the organization, speaking at fundraising events even if the elected 
official avoids “making the ask,” or otherwise promoting donations to the 
organization as presumptive evidence of affiliation.  Similarly—borrowing 
again from the federal rules defining coordination91—if the elected official is 
involved in the advocacy organization’s decisions concerning the content, 
means, timing, or audience for its public communications that should also 
require a finding of affiliation. 
The Brennan Center for Justice has put forward a slightly different 
template for the determination of affiliation.  It proposes a two-part test to 
determine whether an organization is affiliated with an elected official: 
(i) whether there is a “structural affiliation” based on factors similar to the ones 
cited by the New York City law, and (ii) whether the organization spends a 
“significant portion of its resources (exact amounts would vary by jurisdiction) 
on public communications containing the name or image of that elected 
official.”92  In other words, public communications by the organization 
featuring an elected official would be part of the definition of whether the 
organization is affiliated with the elected official, not, as in New York, the basis 
for a restriction on donations to the organization.  That has the advantage, 
relative to the New York City law, of being more determinate.  Unless the 
organization is spending more than a certain amount—or, pace the New York 
law, a percentage of its expenditures—on public communications featuring the 
elected official, the question of whether the organization is affiliated with an 
 
89. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. L. § 14-701(1)(d); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18225.7(d). 
90. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. 
91. Id. 
92. See LEE ET AL., supra note 27, at 13. 
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elected official would not even arise.  However, there would still be some 
indeterminacy in assessing “structural affiliation,” which, as with New York’s 
law,93 relies on the relatively open-ended concept of whether the elected official 
(or current or recent employee or advisor, or family member) “participates in 
directing the work of the organization.”94 
Moreover, by eliminating coverage of organizations which, even if 
structurally affiliated, do not devote significant resources to featuring the 
elected official, the Brennan Center most likely exempts most of the “mayor’s 
funds” and similar service-delivery affiliates.  That is consistent with the 
Brennan Center’s regulatory call for both disclosure and pay-to-play 
contribution restrictions;95 the New York City law requires only disclosure 
for—and imposes no restrictions on donations to—organizations that do not 
engage in advocacy featuring an elected official. 
Although advocacy organizations probably present the greater danger of 
serving as avenues for undue influence with elected officials, that danger may 
also arise from donations to service-delivery charitable organizations affiliated 
with elected officials or their appointees.  Elected officials may engage in 
fundraising for these organizations and have a stake in their success even if the 
organizations do not engage in public advocacy.  As a result, New York’s 
approach of defining affiliation solely based on the existence of connections 
between the elected official—or an agent or appointee of the official—and the 
organization seems the better approach.  Moreover, it may often be easier to 
find the kind of relationship that indicates affiliation with many of the service 
delivery nonprofits labeled “mayor’s fund” than for the advocacy nonprofits.  
As previously noted, many of the service delivery nonprofits have some formal 
tie to local government, whether in their name or through the appointment of 
board members or staff.  Thus, New York’s definition of affiliated organization 
and its requirement for the disclosure of larger donations is the better one. 
On the other hand, the provision of the New York City law that appears to 
provide an easy opt-out from disclosure may undermine the transparency 
requirement for non-advocacy affiliates.  Exclusion from the disclosure of the 
identities of larger donors should be limited to those that can make a showing 
of a well-founded concern of harassment or reprisal, as the other provision of 
the New York law authorizes. 
But the benefit of the New York law is more in its approach than its 
specifics.  Service-delivery affiliated organizations should be required to 
disclose their large donors.  Advocacy nonprofits—defined by their featuring 
an elected official in a significant fraction of their public communications—
should be required to disclose their donors and be barred from accepting large 
donations from individuals or organizations that do business or seek to do 
business with the elected official’s government.  Affiliation can be established 
by a mix of formal and informal connections between the elected official and 
 
93. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-901. 
94. LEE ET AL., supra note 27, at 12. 
95. Id. at 15–17. 
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the organization, including: the role of family members or past or present staff 
or political aides or consultants in creating or running the organization; 
fundraising and related activity by the elected official for the organization; and 
involvement of the elected official in the development of the organization’s 
public advocacy campaigns. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
Laws imposing transparency requirements for, and dollar or source 
limitations on, donations to organizations seeking to influence government 
action implicate the freedom of association protected by the First Amendment.  
As the Supreme Court has held, donor privacy safeguards unpopular opinions 
and protects donors to unpopular groups from retaliation.96  In so doing, privacy 
protects those groups, too.  The Court has also found that the First Amendment 
protects the right to contribute to candidates and political committees.  This is a 
right of the individual to participate in the political process, and of the freedom 
of association of groups that depend on donations for their ability to advocate 
for candidates or causes on behalf of their supporters.97 
The Supreme Court has, however, also upheld disclosure requirements 
and contribution restrictions as part of the regulation of elections and has 
sustained transparency requirements for those engaged in lobbying.  In the 
elections context, the Court has found that disclosure serves the important 
public interests in preventing corruption and its appearance, and in informing 
the voters of the identities of candidates’ financial backers.  That information 
enables voters to “place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely 
than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign 
speeches.”98  As a result, disclosure promotes informed voter decision-making 
and increases the likelihood that voters’ choices will reflect their electoral 
preferences.  Due to the importance of voter information to democratic 
elections, the Court has treated campaign donor disclosure—including 
disclosure to political party committees and to independent committees that 
expressly advocate for or against candidates—as presumptively valid.  
Exemptions may be available for donations to unpopular groups on an 
as-applied basis, but the burden is on the group seeking an exemption from 
disclosure to show that there is a serious risk their donors will be subject to 
harassment or reprisal if their names are publicly revealed.99 
The Court has also determined that contribution limits can be a 
constitutionally valid means of advancing the important governmental interests 
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.  The Court has 
explained that anti-corruption laws need not be “confined to bribery of public 
officials, but extend[] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with 
 
96. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
97. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
98. Id. at 67. 
99. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
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the wishes of large contributors.  These were the obvious points behind our 
recognition that the Congress could constitutionally address the power of money 
‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and specific’ than 
bribery.”100  Lower courts have also affirmed the constitutionality of 
“pay-to-play” contribution limits, that is, laws that set lower limits on or ban 
contributions to candidates from individuals or firms that do business with or 
are regulated by the office that the candidate is seeking.101 
Outside elections, the Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality 
of requiring lobbyists to disclose who is paying for their activities.  In United 
States v. Harriss,102 the Court emphasized the important public interest in 
knowing who is behind efforts to influence legislative action—to “know who is 
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.”103  Harriss, however, 
dealt with a law that regulated only “‘lobbying in its commonly accepted 
sense’—to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or 
proposed federal legislation.”104 
There is a suggestion in Harriss’ footnotes that applying disclosure 
requirements to money spent on efforts to persuade the public to communicate 
with legislators as part of their efforts to pass or block legislation—what is now 
generally referred to as “grassroots lobbying”—would be constitutional,105 but 
the Court did not address the issue and has not done so in the more than six 
decades since Harriss was decided.  Today grassroots communications are an 
integral part of many contemporary lobbying campaigns.106  There is the same 
legislator- and public-information benefit to learning the identities of donors to 
grassroots campaigns as there is to learning the identities of donors to lobbyists 
who simply work the halls of the state capital.  Nor is there any reason to believe 
that donors to grassroots campaigns are any more at risk of harassment or 
reprisal than donors to campaigns that engage solely in “lobbying in its 
commonly accepted sense.”107  Courts have sustained state laws that require 
financial disclosures by committees active in ballot proposition campaigns.108  
Ballot committee campaigns to influence voter decisions whether or not to 
approve proposed state laws or constitutional amendments closely resemble 
grassroots lobbying to influence legislative action.  To be sure, ballot measure 
 
100. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000), (quoting Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 28). 
101. See, e.g., Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 567 U.S. 
935 (2012); Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. FEC, 577 
U.S. 1102 (2016); Schickel v. Dilger, 925 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Schickel 
v. Troutman, 140 S. Ct. 649 (2019). 
102. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
103. Id. at 625. 
104. Id. at 620. 
105. See Briffault, supra note 78, at 171–72.   
106. Id. at 186–87. 
107. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 620. 
108. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011); Hum. 
Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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campaigns do involve elections.  Like other elections, they culminate at a 
moment in time and yield a dispositive result for a specific issue, unlike 
legislative lobbying, which is ongoing.  But the informational value and threats 
to privacy (or their lack) posed by the disclosure of the donors behind both ballot 
proposition and grassroots lobbying campaigns are analogous. 
Although state grassroots lobbying disclosure requirements are 
widespread, lower courts have divided over the constitutionality of disclosure 
requirements for grassroots campaigns aimed at influencing ordinary 
legislation, and the issue remains unresolved.109  Even with this uncertainty, the 
case for requiring donor disclosure by elected-affiliated-advocacy organizations 
is stronger by far than the case for the disclosure of grassroots advocacy donors 
generally.  For elected-official-affiliated advocacy committees, disclosure is 
justified not only by the legislature’s—and public’s—interest in knowing who 
is trying to influence legislative action, but by the public interest in knowing 
who is trying to win an executive official’s gratitude.  When an organization 
that is established and operated by agents of an elected official, works to 
promote the official’s agenda, prominently and positively features the official 
in its public communications, and benefits from the elected official’s 
fundraising or publicly-stated endorsement, it is likely that at least some of the 
individuals and firms contributing to it are doing so with the hope, if not the 
expectation, that their interests will be taken into account when they are or may 
be affected by government action.  The executive whose policy agenda benefits 
from the support of such a donor may be influenced by the donation when it 
comes time to make a decision that directly affects the donor’s interests.  In this 
context, to follow Brandeis’ metaphor, disclosure would be the best 
“disinfectant”110—if not by reducing the likelihood that the donation will be 
followed by some favorable governmental action, then by making it easier for 
the media, watchdog organizations, or the public to determine when such a 
sequence of events occurs and to assess its significance for the integrity of the 
government’s action.111 
 
109. Compare Fla. Ass’n of Pro. Lobbyists, Inc. v. Div. of Legis. Info. Servs., 525 
F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 2008) (sustaining regulation); Fla. League of Pro. Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 
87 F.3d 457 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); Many Cultures, One Message v. Clements, 830 F. Supp. 2d 
1111 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (same), aff’d in part, vac’d in part, Young Ams. for Freedom, Inc. v. 
Gorton, 522 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1974) (same); with Citizens Union of New York v. Att’y Gen., 408 
F. Supp. 3d 478, 503–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), Mont. Auto. Ass’n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300 (Mont. 1981). 
110. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
62 (Nat’l Home Library Found., Washington, 1933) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy 
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
most efficient policeman.”). 
111. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in, but 
had not yet decided, Americans for Prosperity v Rodriquez, cert. granted sub nom. Americans for 
Prosperity v. Becerra, 141 S. Ct. 973 (2021), and Thomas More Society v. Rodriquez, cert. granted 
sub nom. Thomas More Society v. Becerra, 141 S. Ct. 974 (together “APF”), a pair of cases raising 
the question of what is the standard of review applicable to a state measure requiring the disclosure 
of the names and addresses of major donors to private nonprofit organizations, outside the electoral 
context. Depending on what the Court decides, AFP could have implications for the disclosure 
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Much as the Supreme Court has treated expenditures by parties or political 
committees that are coordinated with a candidate as the functional equivalent of 
a contribution to a candidate and subject to the same rules as contributions,112 
contributions to a committee affiliated with an elected official should be treated 
as contributions to the official.  To be sure, they are not personal gifts or even 
campaign contributions.  Their benefit to the elected official is not to her 
personal wealth or even directly to her electoral success.  There may be a public 
benefit from the program that the advocacy committee is supporting.  But the 
connection to the elected official, the public interest in knowing about it, and 
the public concern over the potential for improper influence are all comparable 
to both campaign contributions and personal gifts.  Disclosure of donations to 
elected-official-affiliated nonprofits advances the same values, and is justified 
by the same concerns, as disclosure of campaign contributions or personal 
gifts.113 
Contribution restrictions are a harder case.  There is a jurisprudence of 
lobbying disclosure but no tradition of limiting contributions to lobbying 
organizations.  Indeed, restrictions on lobbying would almost certainly be 
unconstitutional.114  So, the fact that these organizations advocate policy 
changes would not justify limits on donations to them; to the contrary, their 
policy advocacy is a powerful argument against such a limitation.  Rather, the 
case for contribution limits rests on the affiliation of the organization with an 
elected official and the concern that the organization is a conduit of improper 
influence from the donor to the officeholder.  As the elected-official-affiliated 
advocacy organizations are engaged in constitutionally protected public 
communications in support of legitimate policy objectives—universal pre-K, 
inclusionary zoning, civil service and public pension law changes, education 
reforms, etc.—to be constitutional, any limitation on donations to these 
organizations would have to be narrowly tailored to address only those 
donations that pose the most serious danger of improper influence on 
government action.  That means that limits should be targeted on (i) large 
donations, (ii) from donors who do business with the government or are in a 
business subject to regulation by the government, and (iii) to an organization 
 
requirements proposed by this Article. However, the disclosure requirements challenged in AFP 
were broadly applicable and not narrowly tailored to organizations affiliated with elected officials. 
Whatever the standard of review for disclosure requirements, the government interest in disclosure 
would surely be strong for organizations affiliated with elected officials, and tailoring proposed in 
this Article would minimize the burden on First Amendment rights.  
112. See, e.g., FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 
113. Professor Stephanopoulos also argues that disclosure is an appropriate and 
constitutional means for regulating “quasi campaign finance.” See Stephanopoulos, supra note 25, 
at 405–08. 
114. Professor Stephanopoulos is extremely skeptical about contribution limits as a 
means of regulating “quasi campaign finance.” Id. at 398–401. He thinks they are unlikely to be 
effective and emphasizes their “sheer novelty. There is no modern American tradition of restricting 
nonelectoral, yet still political, speech. To the contrary, the Court has a consistent record of striking 
down such constraints.” Id. at 401. 
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affiliated with an elected official who is in a direct position to help or hinder the 
donor’s business with or regulation by the elected official’s government.  Such 
a contribution limit focused on significant pay-to-play donors has the best 
chance of passing constitutional muster, and ought to do so. 
As the Supreme Court explained in the campaign finance context, the 
burden contribution limits place on the First Amendment rights of donors is 
partly ameliorated by the donors’ freedom to engage in unlimited independent 
spending.  In this context, too, any donors required to limit their contributions 
to the affiliated advocacy committee would still be free to spend as much as 
they want on their own in support of the policy program of the affiliated 
committee.  The limit, thus, would function not as a limit on constitutionally 
protected policy advocacy, but solely as a restriction on pay-to-play 
contributions to an organization closely affiliated with an elected official from 
donors with business interests subject to that official’s decision-making.115  As 
in New York, the level of the contribution limit ought to be modeled on the 
contribution limit for campaign donations.  This underscores the connection 
between the anti-undue-influence justifications behind both sets of restrictions.  
Some pay-to-play donors surely support an affiliated nonprofit not because they 
support the nonprofit’s policy agenda, but as a means of circumventing 
campaign finance limits on donations directly to the elected official.  Preventing 
the circumvention of constitutional contribution limits is a constitutionally 
acceptable justification for further contribution restrictions that are narrowly 
tailored to avoid unduly burdening protected political activity.116 
The last proposed requirement—disclosure of donations to affiliated 
service-delivery nonprofits—may also be tricky to justify as these organizations 
are not engaged in the kinds of efforts to influence legislation that provide some 
of the justification for regulating advocacy organizations.  Their donors are 
engaged in the type of philanthropy that is not ordinarily subject to public 
disclosure.  The basis for requiring disclosure of the significant donors to these 
organizations, thus, is not the type of activity their contributions are financing, 
or even the fact of their support for such work, but the concern that their 
donations are a backdoor means of seeking to influence elected officials.  As 
discussed in Part II, there is evidence some donations have been made as a 
means of establishing a relationship with the public official whose work the 
organization supports.  This is particularly likely when the official is actively 
engaged in fundraising for the organization or when the organization is closely 
identified with the official, such as when the official has a role in naming the 
organization’s board, providing it with staff, giving it a place on a governmental 
website, or publicly celebrating the organization’s support for local 
 
115. Id. Professor Stephanopoulos sees the ability of dollar-limited donors to switch 
to other means of influencing public policy as a serious weakness for contribution limits rather than, 
as I have suggested, a basis for arguing that the burden on constitutionally protected rights is a 
limited one. Moreover, his central concern is with the ability of interest groups to achieve the public 
policy goals their money is being used to advance rather than the potential for such donations to 
win the gratitude of the elected official affiliated with the donor organization. 
116. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 185 (2003). 
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governmental programs.  Public disclosure of the major donors to the 
organization provides the transparency necessary for determining whether 
support for the organization has become a conduit for influencing the elected 
official affiliated with the organization. 
As the Supreme Court has noted in the campaign finance setting, 
disclosure is the least intrusive form of regulation.  It does not prevent anyone 
from supporting an organization or operate to limit the level of support.117  If 
disclosure of a donation from an unpopular donor or to an unpopular program 
creates a serious risk of harassment or reprisal, the donor is constitutionally 
entitled to an exemption from public reporting.118  To assure that the disclosure 
requirement is narrowly targeted at only those donations that raise the prospect 
of improper influence on the government decision-maker affiliated with the 
organization, only large donations or only donations from donors who do 
business with the affiliated official’s government—or, even more narrowly, 
only large donations from such pay-to-play donors—should be subject to 
disclosure.  That ought to achieve the balance between informing the public 
about who is spending money in a manner that could affect government 
decision-making, while minimizing both the intrusion on donor autonomy and 
the administrative burden on the affiliated service-delivery nonprofit.119 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of elected-official-affiliated nonprofits has taken 
advantage of—and highlighted—a gap in our public integrity laws.  Donations 
to these organizations neither enrich these elected officials personally, nor 
contribute to their electoral fortunes in a manner that our campaign laws can 
reach.  Although they support potentially valuable—and constitutionally 
protected—public advocacy campaigns and service delivery programs, 
donations to these organizations provide an opportunity for individuals, firms, 
and interest groups to obtain improper influence with the elected officials 
affiliated with them and whose policies and initiatives they were created to 
support. 
The public integrity gap can be closed by first, examining the basic 
elements of some of the most prominent of these organizations to determine 
when a public-advocacy or service-delivery nonprofit can be said to be affiliated 
with an elected official, and then, extending some of the basic tools for 
promoting public integrity—transparency requirements and donation 
restrictions—to this new public integrity frontier.  The definition of “affiliated” 
for the public-advocacy nonprofits may be a little tricky since the links between 
the official and the relevant committee are likely to be informal, particularly 
when compared to the more formal mayor’s fund type of service-delivery 
 
117. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010). 
118. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
119. The constitutional analysis of the disclosure proposed here may also be affected 
by the Supreme Court’s resolution of Americans for Prosperity v. Rodriquez, discussed supra in 
note 111.  
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nonprofits.  But the proliferation of affiliated advocacy committees over the last 
decade demonstrates that the connections between the elected officials and their 
supportive committees are real, as are the possibilities for undue influence and 
its appearance.  It is past time to close the public integrity gap.  Targeted 
disclosure requirements and, for the advocacy committees, limitations on 
pay-to-play donors are constitutionally appropriate mechanisms for doing so. 
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